1. Describe methods that Smith and Jones could have used to steal $34 million in cash over 12 years under KOSS's existing internal control system. The second bullet from the AAER is significant. It states "While Koss’s internal controls policy required Michael J. Koss to approve invoices of $5,000 or more for payment, its controls did not prevent Sachdeva and Mulvaney from processing large wire transfers and cashier’s checks outside of the accounts payable system to pay for Sachdeva’s personal purchases without seeking or obtaining Michael J. Koss’s approval." There were various methods Smith and Jones could have used to steal the cash with KOSS's existing internal control system. They include:
• Skimming. Because the wire transfers
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2. Describe various false journal entries that Smith and Jones could have used to cover up the $34 million theft of cash over 12 years.
The case describes that, "...the accounting system could not be locked at the end of the month and there was no audit trail. Sachdeva and Mulvaney were thus able to make undetected post-closing changes to the books and bypass an internal control requiring Michael J. Koss to authorize those changes". These post-closing changes may be false entries done to hide theft during the accounting period. Further, because the reconciliations were done by the same people who initiated or recorded the transactions, the fraud could be covered up. For example, had one of them made an unauthorized purchase at a retail store where the expense were obviously not business related, they could have assigned the expense or expense description to a vendor where the transaction amount would have been normal. If the accounting system was not locked, they could have also just posted the transaction date back to a prior period that isn't likely to be reviewed.
3. Recommend internal controls that MOSS should implement to prevent future cash thefts. First and foremost, the accounting system used should be updated. The case stated that the system was 30 years old and that prior accounting period transactions could not be locked down, which enabled internal control processes to be bypassed. Enhancing internal
Read the David Miller case from Chapter 5. After reading the case, describe a reason why someone who has been entrusted with the firm’s assets would commit a fraudulent act against the company. Based upon your understanding of the case and your professional and personal experience, recommend a series of actions that should have been taken in order to pre
In this case, there are several conspirators who is involved in the fraud receiving punishment from either SEC or federal government. Robert Levin, the AMRE executive and major stockholder, and Dennie D.Brown, the company’s chief accounting officer, were subject to the punishment in the form of a huge amount of fine by the SEC and the federal government. This punishment came from reasons. After AMRE going public, the company have the obligation to publish its financial reports but its performance did not meet expectation. The investigation by SEC shows that Robert took the first step of this scam, fearing the sharp drop of AMRE’s stock price because of the poor performance of company. He abetted Brown, to practice three main schemes to present a false appearance of profitable and pleasant financial reports. Firstly, they instructed Walter W.Richardson, the company’s vice president of data processing, to enter fictitious unset leads in the lead bank and they originally deferred the advertising cost mutiplying “cost per lead” and “unset leads” amount, so that they deferred a portion of its advertising costs in an asset account. The capitalizing of advertising expenses allowed them to inflate the net income for the first quarter of fiscal 1988. Secondly, at the end of the third and fourth quarters of fiscal 1988, they added fictitious inventory to AMRE’s ending inventory records, and prepared bogus inventory count sheets for the auditors. Thirdly, they overstated the percentage
Phar-Mor, Inc was a thriving discount grocery store in the late 1980’s. Phar-Mor was moving product quickly but profit margins were not significant enough to pay the bills. By the early 1990’s, Phar-Mor declared bankruptcy due to fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets, making it one of the largest frauds in U.S. history. Below, we will use auditing standard AU 316.85 Appendix A in conjunction with the video “How to Steal $500 million” to analyze how incentives/pressures, opportunities, and attitudes/rationalizations allowed for fraud to start and continue at Phar-Mor.
2) Frank A. Tassone; the former business manager, Pamela Gluckin; and an accounting clerk, Debra Rigano, who is a niece of Ms. Gluckin embezzled money in a scheme in which Dr. Tassone and Ms. Gluckin and nine of their family members and friends charged $5.9 million for personal items and cash advances on 74 personal credit cards. Then Ms. Gluckin and Dr. Tassone used district checks to pay those bills. The audit found that Dr. Tassone and
Two General Accounting employees—Dan Renfroe and Angela Walter—made journal entries in the amount of $150 million and $171 million, respectively, without detailed support. It was noted that this was not out of the ordinary at WorldCom. In your opinion, was this a proper accounting practice? Explain.
Our project team analyzed the Fraud and Illegal Acts Case (True blood Case Studies- Case 08-9), which involves a questionable sales transaction made between Jersey Johnnie’s Surfboard, an SEC registrant, and Mr. Sinaloa, an independent sales representative of the company. As a simplified overview of the case, an external audit firm was hired on to perform a year-end audit of Jersey Johnnie’s Surfboards, Inc. Towards the end of the audit, the engagement partner notified the auditors that there could be a possibility of fraud and illegal acts made by the company.
The one pattern within the data that appears to be inconsistent yet if the auditors had established an internal control systems would be Monus the founder moving so freely throughout every aspect of the company with no one checking his movements. From choosing what properties to purchase to purchasing supplies. In any company there should be segregation of duties. For example, the person making the deposits should not be the person writing the checks. Had there been stipulations made it would not have been so convenient to commit the
Grant Thornton should be held liable for its reckless negligence because it ultimately prolonged Keystone bank’s ability to continue to partake in fraudulent activities. If the accounting firm would have held itself to GAAS, generally accepted as the minimum standard of professional conduct in performing an audit, Thornton would have known to exercise “heightened skepticism” during this high risk of fraud. Secondly, GAAS required written confirmations from third parties servicing assets in regards to a bank’s balance sheet. Not only did Thornton fail to obtain this written requirement, it also recklessly relied on an oral statement. GAAS also required in a high risk audit that monthly remittances of interest income on assets being serviced by
The Washington Post continues on to say, “… No evidence of specific transactions or of explicit financial links has emerged to back up Blandon’s and Menses’s claims of sending money to the rebels.”
With every internal control weakness a company needs to identify either a control policy or control procedure that will help prevent error or fraud from occuring in the future. Based on my suggestions as to what weaknesses existed at Goodner Brothers, Inc. I have suggested the policies or procedures that could be implemented to help prevent future issues. The internal control I would implement to hinder employee access to the accounting system would be to secure all computer programs with individual usernames and passwords to prevent access from others. The bookkeeper should be the only employee with access to the accounting system and to test this procedure the company would need to try and access the software without a username and password. To monitor the storage warehouse situation, the company should install computer scanning systems and video cameras at each location to supervize whether tires are being scanned in and out upon delivery and pick-up and to determine who and when these transactions are taking place. Semi-annual reviews should be conducted by sales managers to evaluate their sales representative. In addition, strengthening the tone at the top mentality should lie in the hands of each owner by personally reviewing all sales managers to create a top down effect.
Ms. Green created company names that were similar to legitimate vendors of AAMC in which she then registered those trade names with the Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation. She then created fictitious invoices for those companies as actual vendors of AAMC. Using the names that she created, she then opened bank accounts at several local banks. These financial institutions would serve as personal businesses used to receive payment in which she would personally profit from. As an employee of AAMC, Ms. Green reviewed the false invoices and signed off on them which indicated to the accounting department those invoices were approved for payment. Ms. Green also advised with each invoice that the checks generated to pay the invoice, should be returned directly to her versus mailing them out to the fictitious vendor. The accounting department had no way of knowing the vendors
Ashley Johnson is the sole owner of Johnson Real Estate, hereby referred to as “JRE”, which is a sole proprietorship (LLC) that lists and sells real estate in West Virginia. Ashley’s husband James is the president of JRE and is the day to day operator. Besides James, there are two employees: office manager Joan Rogers and receptionist Doris Chambers. The realtors are contracted sub-agents that personally collect commission checks at the end of each month. These realtors receive 65% of the commission granted to the broker, the rest is deposited into JRE’s checking account. Ashley noticed discrepancies in the commission receipts from closings and the actual bank deposits in the year of 20X9. The previous year there were no problems. JRE has not been audited for the past three years due to rapid growth. Ashley filed a report with the local prosecutor, a family friend, and requested a thorough investigation, which resulted in the prosecutor’s office contracting an accounting firm to complete the financial examination. The prosecutor’s office assigned special agents Thomas and Longworth to the case. The prosecutors are Gina Conrad and Barry Morton.
What happened: Millions of dollars in losses were split among the 129 stores and put as an expense on each stores balance sheet ->. In order to balance the expenses, management had to boost its assets by inflating inventory -> The auditor Coopers&Lybrant checked only 4 stores out of 129 in order to safe their money. In addition, they told senior management which stores they will check -> Phar-Mor prepared the inventory in accordance with its balance sheet -> The auditing firm was unable to uncover the fraud.
The Company was a manufacturer of computer hard disk drives (Financial Executives Research Foundation, 2015) based in Longmont Colorado in 1989. The CEO, CFO and other members of management sought to defraud by managing earnings of the Company with fraudulent inventory, receivables and journal entries. The executives and management created boxes of inventory with bricks and scraps of metal for the auditors
1) Anna Thomas committed a fraudulent act by making personal charges and cash withdrawals on Rusher Automotive’s credit card. The accounting profession believes there are three conditions necessary for fraudulent behavior. (See Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. For additional explanation, you may want to review Buckhoff [2001].)