3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W x y z 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 a b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 c 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.

3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W x y z 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 a b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 c 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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