2.00 1.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0 0 Demand I I I I 5 MR 40 15 20 25 30 35 QUANTITY (Thousands of cans of beer) 10 MC = ATC 45 50 Monopoly Outcome en they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce rmation, each firm earns a daily profit of $ cans and charge $ , so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ per can. Given this opolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assum companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry pro , suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set und usive agreement. s's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to while McCovey's profit is now $ to $ . Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit per can. Mays's profit is wh

2.00 1.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0 0 Demand I I I I 5 MR 40 15 20 25 30 35 QUANTITY (Thousands of cans of beer) 10 MC = ATC 45 50 Monopoly Outcome en they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce rmation, each firm earns a daily profit of $ cans and charge $ , so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ per can. Given this opolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assum companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry pro , suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set und usive agreement. s's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to while McCovey's profit is now $ to $ . Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit per can. Mays's profit is wh

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7P

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PRICE (Dollars per can) 2.00 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 + 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 MC=ATC MR 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 QUANTITY (Thousands of cans of beer) Monopoly Outcome When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce information, each firm earns a daily profit of $ cans and charge $ so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ per can. Given this Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to $ while McCovey's profit is now $ Mays increases…
Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Sean and Yvette, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Sean and Yvette can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 5.40 0 0 4.95 40 $198.00 4.50 80 $360.00 4.05 120 $486.00 3.60 160 $576.00 3.15 200 $630.00 2.70 240 $648.00 2.25 280 $630.00 1.80 320 $576.00 1.35 360 $486.00 0.90 400 $360.00 0.45 440 $198.00 0 480 0 Suppose Sean and Yvette form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ __________ per gallon, and the total output is __________ gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Sean and Yvette agree to split production equally. Therefore, Sean's profit is $ __________ , and Yvette's profit is __________ .…
Pleasant Island has two natural gas wells, one owned by Mack and the other owned by Tom. Each well has a valve that controls the rate of flow of gas, and the marginal cost of producing gas is zero. The table below gives the demand schedule for gas on this island. Price (dollars per unit) $100 88888; 70 50 30 20 10 0 Quantity Demanded (units per day) If Mack and Tom form a cartel and maximize their joint profits, the price of gas on Pleasant Island will be $ If Mack and Tom are forced to sell at the perfectly competitive price, the price of gas on Pleasant Island will be $ 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 per unit. (Enter your response as a whole number) per unit (Enter your response as a whole number)
The table shows the demand schedule for a particular product. Quantity Price 0 100 300 90 600 80 900 70 1200 60 1500 50 1800 40 2100 30 2400 20 2700 10 3000 0 Suppose the market for this product is served by two firms who have formed a cartel and are colluding to set the price and quantity in this market. If the marginal cost to produce this product is constant at $40 per unit, then what price will the cartel set in this market? a. $40 b. $50 c. $60 d. $70 e. $80
Explain with diagram why an oligopolist (with few competitors) pays more attention towhat its competitors are doing than a producer in a competitive market (with manycompetitors)does.
Alpha Gear is a fitness apparel company. One of their best selling products are their joggers. The company sells joggers under a block pricing scheme that charges $13 per pair of joggers if the customer buys up to 10 joggers and $8 if they buy 11 to 20 joggers. The demand curve is Q-1400 - 25P, and the marginal cost of making a pair of joggers is $5. What are the profits for Alpha Gear under this pricing scheme? 8975 8600 3600 12200 000
ne Semester 2023 dules nouncements NWP Assessment Play X signments scussions yllabus Grades Zoom People Turnitin https://calstatela.instructure.com/courses/85933/quizzes/382812/take Oligopoly Oaksville has two tennis instructors, Sam and Jack. The figure shows the demand curve and marginal revenue for tennis lesson appointments and the average total cost. Price and cost (dollars per appointment) Microsoft Office 365 Google Apps Type here to search X F1 @ 2 21 A- F2 A+ F3 Quiz: Homework 7 #3 X F4 BI $ 4 70 60 50 40 30 23 10 ☀ - F5 0 X % 5 2 Alt Text: pink glitter ro X Alt Text: appointments Competitive Outcome, (Pcomp, Qcomp) ☀+ F6 6 MR 8 F7 6 4 10 Quantity (appointments per hour) L yu F8 8 & 7 O MC D ATC F9 Negative Manuscript X * 00 8 F10 ( 9 n F11 ) 0 Oracle Peopl 59°F Mostly clouc ☆ A to F12 Hom
If members of an oligopolistic industry wish to maximize profits for the industry, they will likely charge prices that are what a monopoly would charge and all together produce a quantity that is will produce. what a monopoly Select an answer and submit. For keyboard navigation, use the up/down arrow keys to select an answer. a greater than; equal to b equal to; higher than c greater than; higher than d equal to; equal to
Does a monopolistic competitor produce too much or too little output compared to the most efficient level? What practical considerations make it difficult for policymakers to solve this problem?
Suppose tuition fees for a university increase from £3,000 to £9,000. Afterthe increase, enrolment drops by 5%. e) Explain why setting up a cartel and maintaining collusion may be difficultin general.f) Explain how a maximum tuition fee of £9000 imposed by the governmentmay facilitate collusion between universities.
PRICE (Dollars per can) 2.00 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0 0 MC = ATC MR 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720 810 900 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) Monopoly Outcome $0.80 per can. Given this When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce 180 cans and charge information, each firm earns a daily profit of $144.00, so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $288.00. Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Stargell decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while Schmidt continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Stargell's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to now $ , while Schmidt's…
Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together. 2.00 Demand 1.80 Monopoly Outcome 1.60 1.40 MC = ATC 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 MR 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720 810 900 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) PRICE (Dollars per can)