QUESTION 14 Which of the following is the Nash equilibrium of the game in the picture? Du Q = 30 Q = 40 = 30 du's profit = 900 Etisalat du's profit = 1000 Etisalat's profit = 900 Etisalat's profit = $750 Q = 40 Etisalat's profit = 1000 du's profit = 750 a. Du chooses 30, Etisalat chooses 40. b. Du chooses 30, Etisalat chooses 30. C. Du chooses 40, Etisalat chooses 40. d. Du chooses 40, Etisalat chooses 30. du's profit = 800 Etisalat's profit = 800

QUESTION 14 Which of the following is the Nash equilibrium of the game in the picture? Du Q = 30 Q = 40 = 30 du's profit = 900 Etisalat du's profit = 1000 Etisalat's profit = 900 Etisalat's profit = $750 Q = 40 Etisalat's profit = 1000 du's profit = 750 a. Du chooses 30, Etisalat chooses 40. b. Du chooses 30, Etisalat chooses 30. C. Du chooses 40, Etisalat chooses 40. d. Du chooses 40, Etisalat chooses 30. du's profit = 800 Etisalat's profit = 800

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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